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Abstract—The market introduction of automated vehicles has
motivated intense research efforts into the safety of automated
vehicle systems. Unlike driver assistance systems, SAE Level 3+
systems are not only responsible for executing (parts of) the
dynamic driving task (DDT) [1], but also for monitoring the
automation system’s performance at all times. Key components
to fulfill these surveillance tasks are system monitors which
can assess the system’s performance at runtime, e.g. to activate
fallback modules in case of partial system failures. In order to
implement reasonable monitoring strategies for an automated
vehicle, holistic system-level approaches are required, which
make use of sophisticated internal system models. In this paper
we present definitions and an according taxonomy, subsuming
such models as a vehicle’s self-representation and highlight the
terms’ roles in a scene and situation representation.
Holistic system-level monitoring does not only provide the
possibility to use monitors for the activation of fallbacks. In this
paper we argue, why holistic system-level monitoring is a crucial
step towards higher levels of automation, and give an example
how it also enables the system to react to performance loss at a
tactical level by providing input for decision making.
Index Terms—Self-representation, self-perception, self-
awareness, scene, situation, automated vehicle monitoring,
automated vehicle safety
I. INTRODUCTION
AUTOMATED vehicle technology has seen promisingprogress over the last years. Many challenges in per-
ception, planning and control have been tackled for more than
three decades. The results have been key enablers for impressive
public demonstrations. With increasing interest in a commercial
market introduction of such systems, safety for Level 3+ [1]
systems has become a highly active field of research. The
safety-related challenges created by relieving the driver from
perception, control and surveillance tasks in highly uncertain
scenarios are huge, but crucial to solve.
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(grant number 16EMO0285) funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and
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A key aspect of safety engineering for Level 3+ system
is the question of how to ensure safe vehicle operation at
system runtime. On the one hand, this includes guaranteeing
safe nominal behavior e.g. by verifying the safety of system
decisions (e.g. as targeted by Intels Responsibility Sensitive
Safety Framework (RSS) [2]) and system actions [3]). On the
other hand, monitoring tasks are shifted from the driver to the
system for Level 3+ systems. Hence, monitoring mechanisms
are required which enable the detection, isolation, and com-
pensation of faults, which enable performance assessment and
degradation detection for the automated driving function, and
which eventually allow the vehicle to take actions to enter a
risk-minimal state in case of functional degradation.
Classic functional safety design aims at hardening sys-
tems against error propagation beyond a defined system
boundary at a hardware and software level. By providing
sufficient redundancy and monitors, fall-back implementations
or components can be activated to continue system operation at
full (fail-operational) or degraded (fail-degraded) functionality.
For the safe behavior of automated vehicles fail-operational
requirements imply that errors must not propagate beyond the
boundary of the vehicle automation system as a whole.
In this context, system-level monitoring has recently become
a more active field of research [4, 5]. Structures and models
which are used for the implementation of system-level monitors
are, however, greatly varying.
Existing system-level monitoring approaches range from sys-
tems relying on redundant processing paths [6] to more holistic
monitoring approaches, which aim at capability-conforming
system behavior [7–9]. A more recent holistic concept in this
respect is self-awareness for automated vehicles [4, 10] which
strongly relies on the explicit representation of knowledge
about the system itself.
In previous publications, the models which are used to
represent knowledge about the system and its capabilities have
been summarized under the terms self- or ego-representation
[7, 9, 11, 12]. While the term self-representation is also used in
robotics [13], a concrete definition in the context of automated
driving is currently not available.
At the same time, the explicit runtime representation of
knowledge about the system’s capabilities is more than just a
conceptual contribution to the monitoring problem described
above. In our view, the explicit representation of knowledge
about the operational limits of the vehicle and its current
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2performance are key enabling concepts for safe and adaptive
decision making under uncertainty.
To illustrate these concepts, this paper gives an overview
about current approaches for system-level monitoring of
automated vehicles (section II). We use this context to give a
concrete definition of the term self-representation for automated
vehicle systems (section III). Finally, we describe the impact
of self-representation on decision-making (section IV) and
provide an illustrative example scenario to demonstrate how a
holistic self-representation for automated vehicles can assist
safe decision making in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The following summary of related work provides context for
the definitions in section III. For this purpose, related work will
cover two aspects: On the one hand, it provides an overview
about recent contributions to holistic monitoring concepts for
automated vehicle systems. On the other hand, it cites relevant
terminology which will be used to provide a concise definition
of the terms related to self-representation.
A. Holistic Monitoring for Automated Vehicles
The need for monitoring concepts for automated vehicles has
been recognized in a variety of publications. Those approaches
can roughly be divided into two categories: On the one hand,
there are more traditional diagnosis-like approaches which
monitor singular points in the system and resort to boolean
statements if system components are working as expected [14].
On the other hand, there are approaches, which aim at system-
level or functional monitoring [10]. I.e. these approaches, do not
solely rely on local monitoring of singular points in the system,
but rather aim at inferring additional qualitative statements
how the performance of individual system parts impacts the
performance of the system’s overall functionality. The latter
approaches may, of course, make use of the former approaches.
Hence, they put the data which is gathered by different monitors
into a larger context. A key role for establishing what we
call context here is the application of internal models of the
system. In the following, we focus on system-level monitoring
approaches for automated vehicles, as the concepts contribute
to our understanding of self-representation more significantly
than isolated diagnosis-like approaches.
1) Capability-Based Approaches: Initial requirements for
holistic monitoring have already been formulated more than
three decades ago in the context of automated vehicles [15, p. 1]
and autonomous control systems [16] (regarding cyber pysical
systems, the latter concepts have recently been ”rediscovered”,
e.g. by [17]).
Maurer [11] picks up these ideas and formulates the need for
the ego-vehicle to have ”[...] a model of itself in order to react
responsibly” [11, p. 587]. Besides possessing knowledge of its
shape (geometric model) and its dynamics (vehicle dynamics
model), the vehicle needs to be aware of its capabilities in
order to successfully execute its mission [7]. In this context,
the monitoring of such capabilities is mainly reflected in terms
of monitoring control quality metrics to supervise the correct
execution of control algorithms.
These fundamental concepts are further developed by [18]
and [8] who introduce the concept of ability networks as an
input to a central decision making module to select appropriate
behavior for an encountered situation. In all three approaches,
abilities are seen as dedicated components responsible for
executing a particular task in the system.
Schrder et al. [19] apply behavior networks, modeled after
the ability networks presented by [8] and [18]. These networks
are a basis for decision making and use capabilities as means
to modeling if an action (e.g. a lane change) is executable.
Compared to [8, 18], Bergmiller [20] uses a slightly altered
terminology, subsuming the aforementioned abilities as skills1.
He extends the concepts of Siedersberger [18] and Pellkofer
and Dickmanns [8] and proposes to abstract the system’s skills
from a concrete implementation, while assigning each skill
with a performance value, determined by fuzzy inference.
This idea has been developed further [9] to represent the
vehicle’s dynamic driving task in ability and skill graphs,
capturing the dependencies among capabilities and assigning
quality metrics to each node in such a graph. Most recently, we
have applied those graphs for structuring requirements during
the concept phase of an ISO 26262-compliant development
process for automated vehicle systems [21]. The structured
process is aimed at a traceable derivation of quality metrics for
capability representation. Furthermore, we have established
skill graphs as a viewpoint in an architecture framework
[22] for autonomous vehicles. In this context, a capability
decomposition serves as an additional architecture view which
contributes to the traceability of behavioral safety requirements
to technical requirements during system design.
The idea of explicitly formulating necessary capabilities
for the safe operation of an automated vehicle has also been
formulated in a white paper [23] published by a consortium
of several OEMs and a number of tier suppliers joined by
apollo and Baidu. These implementation-agnostic capabilities
are separated into fail-safe and fail-degraded capabilities. The
authors state that, in case of a system failure, fail-degraded
capabilities must be performed with a certain performance
level, until a minimal risk condition is reached. Note that
the formulation chosen in [23] is very similar to the approach
presented in [21]: While we chose to define abstract capabilities
and assign safety goals to them, capabilities as formulated in
[23] can be seen as abstract safety goals for the vehicle. As
we suggested in [22], [23] also propose to allocate capabilities
to functional blocks in the system. Further, [23] suggest to
allocate requirements to the elements which realize the abstract
capabilities, similar to our requirement decomposition approach
published in [21].
Finally, Koopman and Fratrik [24] list sets of system
limitations that must be represented for fault management
in automated vehicle systems. They formulate those limitations
in terms of required capabilities [24].
2) MAPE-K and Self-Awareness: Recent additions to sys-
tematic monitoring approaches in the field of automated driving
stem from the so-called self-x concepts. Self-x concepts have
1Although skills and abilities have distinct definitions in psychology, we
subsume abilities and skills under the more general term capabilities for the
remainder of this paper.
3been established in IBM’s Autonomic Computing framework
[25] for large-scale computing applications and comprise self-
configuration, -optimization, -healing and -protection. In this
context, self-awareness, i.e. the capability of a system to
represent knowledge of itself and its environment [26, p. XXV],
has been described as ”the fundamental basis for any self-x
feature” [27, p. 164].
Self-Awareness has also been described by NASA as a
basis for autonomously operating aircrafts [28]. They define a
”[...] self-aware aircraft, space-craft or system [...]” [28, p. 1],
amongst other factors, as ”[...] one that is aware of its internal
state, has situational awareness of its environment, [and] can
assess its capabilities currently and project them into the future
[...]” [28, p. 1].
In addition to the general concept of self-awareness, a
key architectural pattern in self-x-based autonomic computing
systems is the so-called MAPE-K loop [25]. MAPE-K is a
knowledge-based (hence -K), Monitor, Analyze, Plan, Execute
scheme, which puts particular emphasis on monitoring. Moni-
toring in the context of Autonomic Computing is understood
as monitoring an element (e.g. a hardware resource) and its
external environment at the same time. Hence it subsumes
internal and external aspects for the monitoring task.
With these aspects, capability-based monitoring approaches
can be seen as an important contribution to a self-aware
automated vehicle. Self-awareness is a much broader concept,
establishing a semantic context for system aspects by using
different kinds of models [10]. We will further elaborate on the
relation of self-awareness and self-representation in section III.
There are a number of recent publications which can be
attributed to the concept of self-awareness for automated
vehicles. Some of those publications rather use the term
self-awareness, while focusing on smaller monitoring aspects,
e.g. for anomaly detection in single signals [29] or specific
functions, such as in localization algorithms [30]. In contrast
to these contained approaches, we have introduced the concept
of self-aware automated vehicles [10] and present a general
argument for cross-layer models, i.e. an explicit model-based
representation of different architectural viewpoints to provide
knowledge about the system structure which can be used for
system monitoring. The ideas of that publication are further
developed for the architecture framework presented in [22].
Apart from this, the adaptation of MAPE-K-like structures
to automated vehicle systems has e.g. been proposed by [4]
and [6].
Partially motivated by propositions made in [9, 10, 21], Carr
[4] tailors a MAPE-K-loop toward runtime safety assurance
for automated vehicles. Following Kephart and Chess [25], the
loop resides in parallel to those components of the vehicle
automation system, which implement the actual automated
driving functionality. The individual elements of the loop are
implemented as micro services and individual loops can be
managed by superimposed MAPE-K loops. All loops in the
hierarchy contribute to and draw from shared knowledge bases.
Required knowledge is subsumed under a configuration-, a
capability-, a goal- & adaptation-, a plan- and a context model
represented in a number of ontologies. The application of the
framework is illustrated in a very simple simulated scenario,
only affecting longitudinal control of the vehicle.
The approach presented by Trngren et al. [6] does not make
this clear distinction between the managed element and the
MAPE-K loop. The system rather consists of three MAPE-K
loops in a nominal and a supervisor channel. The nominal
channel includes the nominal automated driving functions to
implement a sense-plan-act scheme. The supervisor channel
includes two MAPE-K loops, one of which monitors the
nominal channel and one which is a degraded version of the
nominal channel. Knowledge is represented in the form of
safety constraints in the knowledge base of the supervisor
channel and provide an explicit analysis module, which is
responsible for switching between nominal and degraded
functionality [6].
While the framework is well argued, the limitation to a
nominal and a supervisor channel resembles classic solutions
for functional safety. With the proposed architecture it only
seems possible to switch between nominal and degraded
functionality. The paper does not mention any possibility to
influence vehicle decisions in the nominal channel by the
information generated in the supervisor channel, which makes
tactical reactions to failures at least difficult.
3) Other Recent Approaches: Other recent publications also
suggest explicit monitoring of Operational Design Domains
(ODDs) [5] or the definition of system-level ”factors” to trigger
graceful degradation in case of malfunctioning system parts
[31]. Conceptwise, this is closely related to representing safety
constraints in a monitoring element, as proposed by [6].
Ishigooka et al. [31] present a variety of architectural and
design considerations for fault-tolerant system design. However,
they assume that monitoring is available and that faults are
detectable without giving details on the actual monitoring
architecture [31].
Colwell et al. [5] take our approaches [9, 10] as a mo-
tivation and propose the concept of Restricted Operational
Domains (RODs) [5]. The framework presents a holistic
approach, trying to establish traceability between functional
requirements determined in the development process and the
resulting originally targeted ODD. At runtime, the system is
divided into a layer which implements the automated driving
function (called system layer) and a layer for supervision. In
the supervision layer, system health monitors provide input
to an ROD Manager, which determines the current ODD
restrictions based on collected monitoring data. An ROD
Monitor determines whether the system is operating within
specification. The monitoring results are propagated to a System
Supervisor, which selects operational modes (e.g. emergency
maneuvers).
While the paper addresses a variety of interesting aspects
and follows traceability as paradigm for the implementation
of its monitors, further architectural considerations, such as
the integration of monitoring results into the algorithms of the
system layer are considered as future work.
4) Conclusion: Considering the approaches described above,
monitoring is often seen as an additional ”layer” of the system
rather than as an integral part of the runtime system, as has
been argued e.g. in [7, 8, 10] or [9]. From the more recent
publications, only [4] and [5] explicitly consider this option:
4[4] even gives a very short simulative example of influencing
runtime behavior of the system, without having an explicit
”fallback layer”. In our view, an automated vehicle must be
provided with both options. On the one hand, it should be able
to adapt its tactical decisions to its remaining capabilities (e.g.
to restrict its behavior to ROD limitations). On the other hand,
as tactical decisions can imply time delays of seconds, critical
errors must be compensated at much higher frequency. For this
reason, a redundant fallback layer could be required.
III. SELF-REPRESENTATION AND RELATED DEFINITIONS
In existing (technical) literature2, the terms self-perception
and self-representation for technical systems have been used
and described before to refer to a system generating knowledge
about itself. However, a concise definition has not been given
so far, as we will argue in the following.
A. Robotics
Over the last 20 years there has been a vast number of
publications dealing with aspects of self-perception and self-
representation in the robotics community (cf. [13, 32, 33]).
While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to
include all details discussed in the robotics domain, Knoll
and Christaller give descriptions, which summarize some of
the most relevant aspects of self-perception and -representation
[13]. They formulate self-perception and self-representation as
key properties of a robot to generate knowledge about itself.
Without either of these properties, according to [13], a robot is
unable to differentiate between itself and the environment
and in consequence unable to assess how it impacts its
environment. For self-perception, they differentiate between
introspective sensors which measure the robot’s internal states3
and exteroceptive sensors which capture the robot’s state in its
environment.
A central aspect of self-representation is the use of models
[13]. This at least includes models of the robot’s shape. An
obvious reason for this is that otherwise, the robot would not
be able to move in its configuration space without colliding
with obstacles. However, models of the robot’s dynamics (i.e.
the differential equations to predict its motions), rule bases,
and more can be applied to enable the robot to simulate its
own behavior before taking actions [13]. While Knoll and
Christaller [13] provide a description of what is required for
a robot’s self-perception and self-representation, they do not
give a clear definition of the terms.
Lanillos et al. [33] give a concrete definition for self-
perception: According to them,
”Artificial self-perception is the machine ability to perceive
its own body, i.e., the mastery of modal and intermodal
contingencies of performing an action with a specific
sensors/actuators body configuration.”
[33, p. 101]
2Terms such as ”the self” or ”the ego”, of course, have a strong history and
associated meanings in (cognitive and behavioral) psychology. For now, we
will focus on technical disciplines using those terms.
3In the following, as argued by [11], we understand state in a broader, i.e.
more semantic, sense than in its purely control-theoretic definition regarding
the value of a system’s state vector.
The second part of this definition can be understood such
that the robot needs to interpret its actions with respect to the
state of its environment – i.e. self-perception is a key property
for the robot to differentiate between actions which manipulate
external objects and actions which manipulate its own body.
B. Automated Driving
Elements for self- (or ego- [11]) representation in the context
of automated vehicles have been described by [11]. In line with
the argumentation of Knoll and Christaller [13], key elements
are models of the vehicle’s own shape and its dynamics. In
addition, [11] includes aspects, such as the representation of
the runtime system in form of running processes, hardware
resources, or a model of the vehicle’s communication network.
However, as in [13], a concrete definition of the term ego-
representation is not given. The same is true of our own
previous publication [9], which cites [13] for the general
concepts of the terms.
Reschka [34] provides a definition of the term self-
representation for automated vehicles, which translates as
follows:
”Self-representation describes an image of the system’s
performance in the current situation. It combines the
internal system state with the current situation.”
[34, p. 144, translated from German]
In the authors’ view, this definition is problematic: On the
one hand, it focuses solely on the performance of the system,
while [11] and [13] include a number of additional aspects
(or models), e.g. a robot’s or vehicle’s shape when describing
self-representation. On the other hand, it does not comply with
the following definitions of the terms scene and situation, as
defined in [12]4:
Here, self-representation has been defined to be part of the
scene. For the following discussions, we use the definition of
the term scene accordingly and will elaborate on aspects of its
definition in subsection III-C:
”A scene describes a snapshot of the environment including
the scenery and dynamic elements, as well as all actors
and observers self-representations, and the relationships
among those entities. [...]” [12, p. 983]
In order to relate the concept of self-representation to
decision making problems, we will also refer to the situation
as defined by [12]:
”A situation is the entirety of circumstances, which are
to be considered for the selection of an appropriate
behavior pattern at a particular point of time. It entails all
relevant conditions, options and determinants for behavior.
A situation is derived from the scene by an information
selection and augmentation process based on transient (e.g.
mission-specific) as well as permanent goals and values.
[...]” [12, p. 958]
Furthermore, section V will describe a short scenario to
illustrate the concept of self-representation in more detail. For
this, we refer to a scenario as ”[...] the temporal development
between several scenes in a sequence of scenes.” [12, p. 986].
4The definitions provided in [12] are the basis for the definitions used in
ISO/PAS 21448 SOTIF [35].
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Figure 1. Block description diagram visualizing models which are part of the system’s self representation (adapted and refined from [7]). Arrows have UML
semantics. Diamond arrow heads depict compositions, dashed arrows are depicting dependencies between models. Lighter blocks depict possible examples. For
simplification, only the most important relations are drawn. Based on [7, p. 59], extended and adjusted for the differentiation between scene and situation.
C. A Definition of Self-Representation for Automated Vehicles
As summarized above, a clear definition of the terms self-
representation and self-perception for automated vehicles which
conforms to the definition of scene and situation has not been
given so far.
1) Self-Representation: With respect to self-representation,
the strong reference to models of the robot’s (or vehicle’s)
internal structures as argued by [11] and [13] are much in
line with the understanding of (mental) representations in
cognitive psychology. In this respect, representations are seen
as ”information-bearing structures (representation) of one kind
or another” [36].
Hence we follow the descriptions of [7] and [13] and propose
the following definition:
A system’s self-representation consists of the set of explicit
internal models of the system’s properties. This set of
models allows the system to infer knowledge about its own
logic and dynamic state and to assess its own possible
actions.
An overview about the models which are part of the system’s
self-representation is given in the block definition diagram in
Figure 1, which is based on [7, p. 59]. Compared to [7], some
of the aspects attributed to the Ego-Subject have been subsumed
under more general terms or have been separated according to
the definitions of scene and situation.
The vehicle’s shape can subsume detailed representations
such as a scene-tree [11], or simpler descriptions such as a
simple storage of the vehicle’s wheel base, track width, etc.
without the explicit relations provided by a scene tree.
The term architecture framework includes explicit (cross-
layer) models of the vehicle’s different architectures and
correspondence relations between different architectural views
(e.g. as described in [10] or [22]). This e.g. includes hardware-,
software- or logic/functional architectures.
Models for the vehicle’s dynamics subsume representations
of the differential equations describing the vehicle’s motion, the
vehicle’s minimum and maximum dynamics, and the physical
(by-design) restrictions on system inputs (e.g. min. / max.
acceleration or steering angles).
Models for the vehicle’s capabilities include performance
metrics for each capability as well as representations of
functional or technical requirements which are the basis for the
associated performance metrics (cf. [21]). The dependencies
between capabilities (e.g. formulated in a graph model [9]) are
structured in a dedicated architectural view of the system’s
architecture framework model.
Finally, we assume an explicit representation of non-
functional requirements (e.g. timing requirements for con-
trollers), which need to be monitored at runtime. Possible
relations between functional and non-functional properties of
the system can again be established using the representations
of the architecture framework, e.g. by performing dependency
analysis across multiple architecture models (c.f. [37], [38]).
While the targeted ODD (or domain in [7]) has massive
implications for the models in the system’s self-representation,
we do not consider the ODD itself as a part of the system’s
self-representation. This would, in our view, diminish the role
of the ODD. The ODD impacts all parts of the system’s design,
as it is the origin of all development assumptions. Hence we
regard the ODD as a closely related but separate concept for
knowledge-representation, which governs many aspects of the
vehicle’s self- and environment representation (cf. Figure 1
depicted in green). For further elaboration, section IV will
provide a short review of our understanding of the ODD, which
conforms to the ideas presented by Koopman and Fratrik [24].
With respect to [7], we consider optimization criteria and the
desired degree of automation to be components of the vehicle’s
transient goals. The vehicle’s goals have been argued to be
part of the situation representation [12, p. 986], as they are
rather external stimuli to decision making than internals of the
vehicle’s self-representation – although this might be debatable
for Level 5 vehicles, if one would like to make a case for
autonomous vehicles which are allowed to choose their own
mission objectives.
Aspects of the system’s architectures (hardware, processes,
6communication [7]) have been subsumed under the representa-
tion of the architecture framework.
Finally, the vehicle’s relations to other objects are part of
the scene representation.
2) Self-Perception: Following the definition of self-
representation, we define self-perception in a broader sense.
Lanillos et al. [33]’s definition is, in the authors’ opinion, too
restrictive, as it is only related to the robot’s body. Conforming
with [9, 13] and [39], for us, self-perception rather describes
a process of acquiring general knowledge about the internal
state of the automated vehicle. Just as environment perception
provides an outer perspective of the vehicle, self-perception
provides an additional inner perspective (cf. [39]). Hence we
propose the following definition:
Self-perception describes the process of generating knowl-
edge about the internal state of the system by means of
(model-based) data and information processing. Raw data
for processing can be acquired by internal (proprioceptive)
sensors or environment (exteroceptive) sensors. The models
applied to infer and store knowledge about the internal
state are part of the system’s self-representation.
With these definitions, we can also establish the relation of
self-perception and self-representation to self-awareness.
3) Relation to Self-Awareness: Following the proposition
by Gregory et al. [28] cited above, self-perception and self-
representation are the fundamental properties which separate a
self-aware system from a non-self-aware system. Only by gath-
ering knowledge about its current state (self-perception) and
the required models to store the results (self-representation), the
system can properly predict its actions and, more importantly,
its future capabilities as demanded by [28].
IV. SELF-PERCEPTION & SELF-REPRESENTATION FOR
SAFE DECISION MAKING
In our view, a comprehensive self-representation and self-
perception is also a decisive factor for a vehicle automation
system to execute safe actions at all (strategic, tactical, reactive)
architectural levels. In particular, we see it as a key element
in planning safe behavior under uncertainty and by that as a
key contribution to increased autonomy of vehicle systems.
To support this argument, we will shortly revisit our
understanding of the ODD, as it establishes the system’s general
limits of operation and thus the general limits of the vehicle’s
action space (cf. subsection IV-C). Following this, we will
argue why the uncertainty that is inherent to the formulation
of ODD boundaries entails the need for monitoring.
A. Aspects of the Operational Design Domain – Uncertain
ODD Boundaries5
The ODD as a concept has gained a lot of traction for safety
considerations for automated vehicles [5, 24, 40]. However,
the definition of the ODD as
”Operating conditions under which a given driving au-
tomation system or feature thereof is specifically designed
to function, including, but not limited to, environmental,
geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the
5Section maybe extended in future revision.
requisite presence or absence of certain traffic or roadway
characteristics.” [1, p.14]
is rather broad. The same is true, as Koopman and Fratrik
[24] note, for the ODD elements presented in [41]. While both
references [1, 41] make it clear that the ODD is more than
just a geofencing mechanism, specifics are not given.
For this reason, [24] present a more comprehensive list of
factors which constitute the ODD, as well as a number of
factors contributing to relevant Object and Event Detection
and Response (OEDR) [1] strategies. While we see no need to
extend their lists for this paper, we would like to stress their
side-comment on the relation between the ODD and OEDR
factors in which they state that ”Specific events might not be
applicable if no associated relevant objects are encompassed
by the ODD” [24, p. 2]: In other words, the boundaries of
the ODD have direct impact on which objects and events the
automated driving system needs to account for and are thus
already by itself a key source for requirements in all parts
of the system. In our view, this has two implications which
concern the general formulation of ODD boundaries, and the
complexity which is allowed within a given ODD, respectively.
A first important fact is that moving in public traffic and
thus the decisions made by the vehicle automation system
always come with an inherent risk. This risk is caused by
the fact that our traffic system basically constitutes an open
world, subject to significant epistemic uncertainty [42]: almost
anything can happen at any time. In consequence, this risk is
directly reflected in uncertainty about the boundaries of the
selected ODD when specifying the vehicle automation system.
The formulation of an ODD with corresponding OEDR
strategies can now be seen as an attempt to convert the origi-
nally open world into a closed world under a set of (hopefully)
explicitly stated assumptions. By this, the influence of the risk
that originates from the traffic system itself can be mitigated by
choosing smaller ODDs and/or appropriate OEDR strategies.
However, the inherent risk can never be fully eliminated, as
the assumptions about ODD boundaries and OEDR strategies
remain subject to uncertainty and are hence potentially invalid.
– Except, maybe, when choosing a maximally conservative
system design which would compromise mobility.
At the same time, increasing complexity of an ODD can
at some point cause a combinatorial explosion of possible
scenarios (cf. [24]) which introduces additional uncertainty
about incomplete specification and validation, respectively.
B. An Argument for Decision-Making Supported by Self-
Representation and Self-Perception
Given our understanding of the ODD as described above,
we will now take a step back and provide a possible argument
for a system implementation which does not rely on self-
representation and -perception. We will make a counterfactual
argument assuming a fully robust design approach.
When designing automated vehicles for safe behavior, an
obvious option is to take a classic approach from safety
engineering: Implementing a fully diversely redundant and
thus robust and fail-operational automation system. This would
include fully redundant hardware platforms, software modules
7and algorithms, as well as sensors and actuators. In case of sub-
system failures (hence system-level errors for the automated
vehicle as a whole), such a system would have little to no
requirements to adapt its behavior decisions to these sub-
system failures. Due to the system’s design, a propagation
of sub-system failures beyond the overall system boundary
would be extremely unlikely and thus the vehicle’s overall
performance would not be impaired. Monitoring efforts could
then be reduced to classic approaches such as majority voting
in order to detect when to switch to a redundant component. A
holistic system-level monitoring approach as discussed above
would not be required.
An argument from this point of view could come to the
conclusion, that the representations discussed in section III
would thus not be required, as well. However, this would still
neglect the influence of an ODD formulation as described in
subsection IV-A: When formulating ODD boundaries as a way
to simplify the vehicle’s operational space, this creates the need
for monitoring if the vehicle is operating within these limits.
Uncertain ODD boundaries increase the need for monitoring
in a way as this monitoring must be robust enough to account
for this uncertainty: The system must be able to assess how
close the vehicle is operating to its ODD limits and how likely
it is that the boundaries will be violated.
For this the system needs representations to predict its own
behavior. These representations must at least include dynamics
models (cf. Figure 1), and an idea of the ego vehicles shape.
In addition, the vehicle also needs to represent if it is still
able to respond to objects and events (i.e. implement OEDR
strategies) properly. This can be seen a representation the basic
by-design capabilities needed for operation in a defined ODD.
In summary, most aspects of self-representation mentioned
in section III remain important input to decision making, even
when opting for a robust system implementation rather than
opting for the system-level monitoring approach argued in
section III. At least, this is true when designing a system so
that it is able to respect its ODD at runtime, which is the only
possibility to ensure safe ODD-conforming behavior. This view
is supported by recent publications which formulate the need
to monitor the vehicle’s ODD [5, 24, 40]. 6. In a fully robust
design approach, the only aspects of the self-representation
which would lose their relevance is the representation of the
architecture framework and with it the representation of non-
functional requirements. These could be spared due to the
available redundant elements in all architecture views.
Additionally, we think a fully robust setup to be an unlikely
design choice, mainly due to the cost related to the implementa-
tion of a fully redundant system, and physical limitations e.g. of
sensor technology. In consequence, we think that a self-aware
design approach, which considers system-level performance
monitoring as well as a coherent self-representation and self-
perception for decision making, is a far more promising
approach to implement safe vehicle behavior.
6While [40] disregard self-representation due to a number of misinterpreta-
tions of the concepts presented in [12], they introduce the concept of ”internal
operating conditions”, which ”[...] are the conditions pertaining to the ADS
itself and its user” [40, p. 5]. It remains unclear to us what ”internal operating
conditions” should reflect apart from the of the system’s state and properties.
A
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Figure 2. Restrictions of the vehicle’s action space in analogy to the
presentation of the Restricted Operational Domain in [5] - black: total action
space (resulting from the design-time system capabilities which allow operation
in the system’s ODD), red: restrictions imposed by elements in the vehicle’s
environment, blue: runtime-restrictions imposed by self-perception (due to
degraded capabilities), green: admissible action space.
C. Combining Internal and External Representations
According to [39], the system makes decisions based on the
assessment of a situation. I.e. the system interprets a scene by
selecting and augmenting the information in the scene with goal-
and value-specific information which is relevant for the driving
function. This selection and augmentation is performed during
situation assessment. It can be implemented, amongst others,
by filtering objects which have no chance of interacting with
the vehicle, by predicting other traffic participants’ behavior,
by combining the scene with the automated vehicle’s desired
route, or by selecting relevant traffic rules. This, in turn, means
that an evaluation or judgment of collected knowledge about
the environment is not performed during scene creation.
The same is true for the internal representations of the
vehicle: While its internal models are applied to infer and
store knowledge e.g. with respect to the system’s capabilities
during scene creation, no assessment is performed, whether
the system’s capabilities are sufficient to perform a certain
maneuver. This is only performed during situation assessment,
when the system’s (mission) goals (and values) are known.
Here, knowledge obtained through self-perception and stored
in the self-representation can be used to influence decision
making. In analogy to the concept of µODDs presented in
[24] and the concept of restricted operational domains (RODs)
presented by [5], self-representation and self-perception are, in
our view, key to ensure that system actions keep the system
inside a safe operational domain.
For a more formal description, we borrow the notation of a
Markov decision process: Given a state space S and a (possibly
discrete) action space A, consider the system being in a state
s ∈ S. The entirety of A is the set of actions which is based
on all system capabilities required to operate in the system’s
target ODD (which would be an open world for SAE Level
5 systems). The general challenge when making decisions is
to ensure that an action a ∈ A is only taken if the resulting
state s′ ∈ S is inside a subset of S which corresponds to a
safe operational domain.
Hence, the results of environment- and self-perception both
restrict the vehicle’s action space: Actions leading to an
unacceptable risk emerging from the vehicle’s behavior must be
avoided. Restrictions from environment perception e.g. should
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Figure 3. (Objective) initial scene of example scenario: Scene from an
observer’s point of view. Arrows indicate objects’ current velocities, orange
ellipse represents a cyclist. Light blue areas depict sensor coverage of two
automated vehicles (only showing angular range; radial range is assumed to
cover the complete scene). Illustration extended7 from [12, p. 986, Fig. 6].
avoid actions which cause unacceptable collision probabilities.
Restrictions from self-perception e.g. should avoid actions for
which the system has insufficient capabilities. An example for
the latter restrictions would be to avoid lane changes if the
vehicle has insufficient sensor coverage to its rear.
With these assumptions, the action space A can be partitioned
into two subsets (cf. Figure 2): Subset Aext ⊆ A is inadmissible
due to restrictions from environment perception and prediction.
Subset Aint ⊆ A is inadmissible due to restrictions from self-
perception and the anticipated internal system states.
Hence the admissible set of actions Aadm which keeps
the vehicle in a safe operational domain is the cross section
Aadm = Aenv ∩Aint (note that in general Aenv ∩Aint 6= ∅).
In the following section we will give an example how self-
and environment representation actually restrict the admissible
action space of an automated vehicle.
V. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
To illustrate the aspects of self-perception and self-
representation in the context of scene modeling and situation
assessment further, we will refer to an example scenario. The
start scene of the scenario is shown in Figure 3. No viewpoint
is chosen, i.e. the objective scene is displayed. The vehicles
in the center (blue) and top right (dark red) are automated. A
cyclist (orange) is riding on a separate bike lane in parallel to
the blue automated vehicle. No inactive observers are present
as elements in the scene.
Note that for an objective scene description by an omniscient
observer as shown in Fig. 3, according to [9], both vehicles
self-representations would be part of the scene description.
Considering e.g. a simulation environment, the simulation
system can be seen as an omniscient actor in the scene would
have knowledge about the stored self models of both vehicles.
For the sake of providing a visual example how self-
representation impacts the scene and situation, we assume
that both automated vehicles do not have full sensor coverage:
7Modified with the author’s permission. Original graphic c©2015 IEEE
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Figure 4. (Ground-Truth) Situation derived from the scene shown in Figure 3:
Dotted arrows indicate predicted trajectories of objects, transparent block arrows
indicate mission objectives. Transparent dashed/opaque solid arrows indicate
action spaces without/with consideration of self-representation, predictions
and mission objectives. Illustration extended7 from [12, p. 986, Fig. 6].
While the blue vehicle is blind to its rear, the red vehicle
cannot perceive anything to its left. Apart from this, we assume
fully intact mechanics, actuators, and computing hardware. All
algorithms are assumed to perform as intended.
Models in the self-representations of both vehicles, in
particular the capability representations, store this information
in terms of the vehicles’ remaining field of view and in terms
of the stored capability metrics. In order to assess the current
situation, the goals and values of the blue and red vehicle must
be considered respectively. For the given scenario, we assume
that both vehicles have mission objectives which result in the
goal to pass the intersection going straight.
In the following, we will discuss the impact of both vehicle’s
self-representations separately at the example of Figure 4.
For all non-automated traffic participants, we assume straight,
constant-speed trajectories.
For the blue vehicle, its degraded sensor performance has
little impact on the vehicle’s mission. It has full view of all
arms of the intersection and is also able to perceive the cyclist
riding in the bike lane. It can perceive the red and green
vehicles as well, while the orange vehicle is not part of the
blue vehicle’s environment representation.
If we consider the vehicle’s action space as a set of
maneuvers, possible actions the vehicle could take by design
are: stopping, turning right, turning left, or passing the
intersection going straight (blue arrows in Figure 4). In this
situation, restrictions of the action space from the vehicle’s
self-representation only concern stopping maneuvers: As the
vehicle cannot determine whether another vehicle is following
closely, harsh braking should not be performed. Action space
restrictions from the environment representation only concern
a possible right turn. According to the prediction of the cyclist,
there is a chance of collision when the vehicles’ actions
correspond to the transparent dashed arrow in Figure 4. The
resulting admissible action space hence contains maneuvers
which lead to stopping slowly, letting the cyclist pass, turning
left while staying behind the yellow vehicle, and crossing the
intersection straight.
9The vehicle can also use the models in its self-representation
to simulate its own behavior (e.g. predicting its motions along
the thin arrows in Figure 4) to evaluate its options and assess
the most beneficial action with respect to its mission. As can
be seen in Figure 4, the blue vehicle can fulfill its mission
without major restrictions: The most beneficial action with
respect to the vehicle’s mission goal would be to go straight.
In contrast to this, the red vehicle is severely impacted by
its remaining sensing capability. As it cannot perceive the right
arm (from the topview) of the intersection, the only admissible
action in this situation is stopping. The vehicle is lacking the
required performance to fulfill its mission.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an overview about functional
monitoring approaches for automated vehicles. In this context,
we motivated the need for a coherent representation of internal
models, i.e. knowledge about the system’s current internal
state. We gave definitions for the terms self-perception and self-
representation for automated vehicles consistent with existing
definitions for the terms scene and situation, and provided a
taxonomy for the contents of the self-representation.
We provided an example scenario to illustrate the impact of
self-representation for situation assessment and safe decision
making. What becomes clear from the given scenario is that
an automated vehicle’s self-representation is highly relevant
for a coherent situation assessment. At the same time, only by
providing situational context, such as the vehicle’s goals, the
knowledge stored in the vehicle’s self-representation can be
applied properly for decision making.
This is, of course, true of all elements in the vehicle’s
self-representation (cf. Figure 1), not only for the sensing
capabilities which we used as an example here.
In summary, a sufficiently detailed self-representation must
contain explicit representations of all relevant system-internal
aspects for planning and executing safe vehicle behavior in a
target ODD.
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